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PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGEE AND CREDITOR OF
MORTGAGOR IN AN UNRECORDED CHATTEL MORTGAGE
"A mortgage of personal property is void as against
all creditors of the mortgagor, both existing and subse-
quent, whether or not they have or claim a lien upon such
property, and subsequent purchasers, pledgees, mortga-
gees, and incumbrancers of the property for value and in
good faith, unless it is accompanied by the affidavit of the
mortgagor that it is made in good faith, and without any
design to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, and unless
it is acknowledged and filed within ten days from the
time of execution thereof ,,1 Rem. Stat., see. 3780,
P C., see. 9747.
The interpretation of this statute by the Washington Supreme
Court has not always been uniform or certain. In determining
the priority of the respective claims of a mortgagee under a de-
fective mortgage2 and of a creditor of the mortgagor, several ques-
tions may be raised which can not be answered with certainty as
the law stands today I
However some aspects of the contest between the creditor and
the mortgagee are definitely settled. Thus it is clear that one who
extends credit to another without notice, actual or constructive,
of a chattel mortgage upon the latter's property acquires an in
personam claim against the debtor-mortgagor which he is entitled
to prosecute to judgment, and upon which he may proceed by
levy or attachment against the property in disregard of the mort-
gage.4 Contrary to the general rule elsewhere,5 receipt of actual
I Italics ours. !I'he italicized portion was added by the Legislature in
1915. Wash. Laws, 1915, ch. 96, p. 277.
2 There are three requirements-acknowledgment, an affidavit of good
faith, and filing or recordation. Failure to comply with any one of these
brings the instrument within the scope of the statute. Smith v. Allen,
78 Wash. 135, 138 Pac. 683, Ann. Gas. 1915D, 300 (1914). The term "de-
fective" as used in this discussion means failure to meet any or all
of these requirements.
3 The rights of subsequent purchasers are well defined. Unless they
purchase for value and in good faith, they take subject to the mortgage.
Daranv . Levns, 1 Wash. 582, 20 Pac. 309 (1889) Mendenhall v. Kratz,
14 Wash. 453, 44 Pac. 872 (1896) Clark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 199 Pac.
721 (1921) Fleming v. I£ncoln Trust Co., 124 Wash. 317, 214 Pac. 5
(1923) West American Finance Co. v. Finstad, 146 Wash. 315, 262 Pac.
636 (1928) Sullivan v. Lewts, 170 Wash. 413, 16 Pac. (2d) 834 (1932)
Morton v. Armour 173 Wash. 462, 23 Pac. (2d) 887 (1933).
'Baxter v. Smith, 2 Wash. Terr 97, 4 Pac. 35 (1882) Willamette
Casket Co. v. Cross, etc. Co., 12 Wash. 190, 40 Pac. 729 (1895) Manhattan
Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal Co., 16 Wash. 499, 48 Pac. 333 (1897) Kato v.
Union Oil Co., 92 Wash. 473, 159 Pac. 592 (1916) Pacific States Securities
Co. v. Austin, 146 Wash. 494, 263 Pac. 732 (1928). Any doubt as to whether
subsequent creditors were protected was banished by the 1915 amend-
ment. See on that point Roy & Co. v. Scott, Hartley & Co., 11 Wash. 399,
39 Pac. 679 (1895) Urquhart v. Cogs, 60 Wash. 249, 110 Pac. 1001 (1910).
5Fiegel v. 1st Nat. Bank, 90 Okla. 26, 214 Pac. 181 (1923) Soehrsn, V.
Hemn, 214 Iowa 1060, 243 N. W 330 (1932)
'Bonnevzere v. Cole, 90 Wash. 526, 156 Pae. 527 (1916).
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notice before a judgment lien or levy is obtained will not defeat
that lien. And, by virtue of that portion of the statute protecting
incumbrancers for value and in good faith, any mortgage or other
incumbrance which is innocently acquired upon the property is
prior to the defective mortgage.6
If the extension of credit was made without notice, but actual
notice was received before the creditor acquired a mortgage or
other incumbrance upon the property, the creditor's incumbrance
has been held to be superior. Early cases stated that in the incep-
tion of the transaction, the defective mortgage was void as to the
creditor, and he might thereafter disregard it, any claim he ac-
quired would necessarily be superior to the mortgage which was
as to him a nullity I The recent case of Seaboard Dairy Credit Co.
v. Paulsen8 reached the same result by somewhat different reason-
ing. It was said that notice of an existing mortgage at the time
credit is extended rather than the time security is taken governs
priority The Court stated that when a creditor extended credit
in good faith without notice, the character of his subsequent in-
cumbrance should be determined as of that time, since that is the
time at which value is given.
In these situations the innocent creditor has achieved a prior
claim upon his debtor's property, whether it takes the form of a
judgment lien, statutory lien, or incumbrance by act of the parties.
If credit were extended with actual notice of a defective mortgage,
would the same results be reached?
Considering first the position of an unsecured creditor of the
mortgagor, it appears that he is entitled to prosecute his claim to
judgment and attach or levy upon the property regardless of his
actual notice of the defective chattel mortgage already upon the
property The language and arrangement of the statute seems to
indicate that the restrictions of "for value and in good faith" are
attached only to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. That
was the early interpretation placed upon the statute by the Court.
As to a creditor, a defective mortgage was regarded as "abso-
lutely void," regardles of notice.9 In interpreting the statute after
the 1915 amendment, 0 the Court apparently adhered to this view,
since the possibility of tardy recordation serving as actual notice
was not extended to subsequent creditors. The inference is that
as to creditors, such actual notice would be immaterial. It is con-
tended, however, that subsequent cases have changed the law In
a note in 68 A. L. R. 274, Washington is classified as following
'Smith. v. Allen, 78 Wash. 135, 138 Pac. 683, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 300
(1914) Belcher v. Young, 90 Wash. 303, 155 Pac. 1060 (1916) Embagt v.
Northwestern Imp. Co., 101 Wash. 558, 172 Pac. 834 (1918).
174 Wash. Dec. 539, 25 Pac. (2d) 974 (1933)
'Baxter v. Smith, 2 Wash. Terr. 97, 4 Pac. 35 (1882) Blumazuer v.
Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 Pac. 844, 85 Am. St. Rep. 966 (1901) and see
notes 3, 4 and 7, supra,
10 Clark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 199 Pac. 721 (1921). See note 1.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the usual rule that actual notice supplies any deficiency in record-
ing and that one who deals with knowledge of a prior defective
mortgage can take only subject thereto, whether he be creditor,
purchaser, or encumbrancer. As authority for that proposition,
Asbury v. M ller" is cited. Jones in his treatise on Chattel Mort-
gages 2 sinilarly classifies this jurisdiction, solely upon the basis
of the decision of North Pacific Bank v. Pacific Mere. Agency.13
If such classification is accurate, apparently the construction of
the statute has undergone a decided change. Do the cases cited
by the authorities necessitate that result ?
In Asbury v. Miller,4 the mortgagee of an improperly recorded
mortgage brought suit and obtained a judgment of foreclosure.
After decree of foreclosure but before sale, another and subse-
quent mortgage of the same property brought suit to contest the
superiority of the prior lien. In that action, general creditors of
the mortgagor intervened, attempting to assert the invalidity of the
first mortgage. According to the rules of practice in this state,
intervention in any cause must be made before trial,1'5 and since
the general creditors had no -m rem claim against the property
they could not attack the validity of a judgment of foreclosure by
subsequent intervention, and certainly not by intervention in an-
other action. Their rights had been foreclosed and terminated so
far as that property was concerned. Unfortunately, the Court
cited on this point only cases which had been largely over-
ruled by the amendment of 1915 and Clark v. Ki7ian.16 As sug-
gested, the result is sound, and the case need not be taken either
as restoring that portion of decisional law which the Legislature
desired to terminate, or as changing the law insofar as creditors'
rights are concerned. The creditors met defeat not because they
extended credit with notice, but because they failed to assert their
claims in a timely and proper maner.'7
11132 Wash. 235, 232 Pac. 360 (1925). Two other cases cited involve
Tights of subsequent purchasers (note 6).
"Vol. I (Bower's Ed.), sec. 317, p. 503.
13153 Wash. 37, 279 Pac. 103 (1929).
"Note 11, supra.
"Rem. Rev. Stat., sec 202; State ex rel Williants v. Superzor Court,
91 Wash. 40, 157 Pac. 28 (1916) Longmzre v. Yakima Highlands Co., 95
Wash. 302, 163 Pac. 782 (1917) Nemn v. Pacific Coast & Norway Packing
Co., 105 Wash. 192, 177 Pac. 739 (1919).
"
8Heal a'. Evans Creek Coal and Coke Co., 71 Wash. 225, 128 Pac. 211(1912) Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. Perry, 77 Wash. 352, 137 Pac. 483(1914) Watson 'v. 1st Nat. Bank, 82 Wash. 65, 143 Pac. 451 (1914) Spo-
kane Merc. Ass'n. v. 1st Nat. Bank, 86 Wash. 367, 150 Pac. 434, L. R. A.
1918A, 323 (1915) Haskzns v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 93 Wash. 63, 159 Pac.
1198 (1916). These cases, overruling Willamtte Casket Co. v. Cross, etc.,
Co., note 4, supra, stated that an unrecorded chattel mortgage was good as
to creditors who had acquired no lien, and later recordation or taking pos-
session of the property by the mortgagee would revive and validate the
mortgage as against all general creditors. In Clark v. Kilian, note 10,
supra, it was said that the amendment of 1915 was passed with the obvious
purpose of rendering liens unnecessary and subsequent recordation in-
effective.
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In North Pacific Bank v. Pacific Merc. Agency,18 a garageman
performed services on a car which he knew to be encumbered by
a purchase-money mortgage. The mortgage was improperly re-
corded. He retained possession of the car as security for his claim
of $65, and assigned his claim to the Mercantile Agency The
Agency recovered judgment against the debtor-mortgagor and
seized and sold the car on execution sale for $75, far below its
market value. The purchaser at the sale knew of the mortgage, and
the validity of the judgment and sale were seriously questioned.
The car came into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, and the mort-
gagee brought trover for the conversion of the car against the
four parties who dealt with the car with knowledge of his claim.
Recovery was had for the reasonable value of the car.
At first reading, the decision seems to deny a creditor the right
to levy execution upon defectively mortgaged property, and appar-
ently the result is reached solely upon the basis of the knowledge
which the defendants at all times possessed. The decisive value
of the case, however, is hard to determine. The only issue argued
to the Court on appeal was the applicability of Section 3780 and
the defendant's admitted liability if the facts were within the
scope of that section. Raving found that the defendants' conten-
tion was without merit, and feeling that the whole transaction
smacked of fraud and an utter disregard of the rights of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee, the Court reached the just and, on the briefs
submitted to it, the only possible result. It should be noted that
the decision speaks only of the liability and rights of subsequent
purchasers,'9 and it is certain that the Court did not and was not
asked to regard any of the defendants as being a creditor It is
submitted that this and the Asbury case should have little weight
in this discussion and are but scant authority for the proposition
for which they are cited. The law in this state is apparently un-
changed, as to a creditor, a defective mortgage is invalid regardless
of any question of actual notice.20
," Has an unsecured creditor of the mortgagor such an interest in fore-
closure proceedings as to permit intervention by him? Apparently not.
Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co., 4 Wash. 600, 30 Pac. 741 (1892) but cf.
State ex rel Williams v. Superior Court, 91 Wash. 40, 157 Pac. 28 (1916)
x Note 13, supra.
If, however, the decision rests upon the defendants being subsequent
purchasers, two questions are presented. The garageman and his assignee
were not purchasers-should they not be entitled to realize their 'n per-
sonam right against the debtor without liability for conversion? And
unless the purchaser at execution receives similar immunity, it appears
the creditor's right of realization will have little practical value; such
a purchaser should have the same rights, at least, as the creditor. There
are apparently no cases upon the latter point under statutes comparable
to section 3780.
2 See Robinson, Thieme d Morris v. Whittier 112 Wash. 6, 191 Pac.
763 (1920) Pacific States Securities Co. v. Austin, 146 Wash. 492, 263
Pac. 732 (1928) Kliks v. Tenet Mortgage Co., 162 Wash. 514, 299 Pac.
367 (1931)
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The Asbury case did decide one pertinent question, however,
and its decision is well fortified by authority If a creditor has
notice of an existing mortgage at the time he extends credit, and
at that time acquires as security a mortgage or other ineumbrance
upon the already mortgaged property, it is clear that his sn rem
right against the property is inferior to the prior mortgage of
which he had notice.2 ' There is no extension of credit in good faith
upon which- his subsequent incumbrance may be based.
If such an incumbrance immediately acquired is inferior to a
defective mortgage, a fortwr& any mncumbrance subsequently ac-
quired should be similarly inferior. To permit it to achieve priority
would penalize a cautious and diligent creditor and reward dilatory
conduct insofar as demanding security is concerned. Yet one case
has drawn a distinction of that sort. In Blumauer v. Clock,2 2 labor-
ers who knew of a mortgage upon their employer's property before
they began work filed statutory liens upon that property The
mortgage was unacknowledged. It was said that there was a dis-
tinction between one who extended credit only upon security and
one who extended credit with no thought of security, relying upon
his in personarn claim against his debtor. In the inception of the
latter's contract, he was not an incumbrancer but a creditor, as
to his, therefore, the defective mortgage was void and his lien
was superior thereto. The Court also said that perhaps this dis-
tinction should be drawn only in favor of creditors who acquired
their subsequent lien by operation of law. Subsequent cases28 re-
fused to limit this "inception of the obligation" test to statutory
liens, and it has been used to grant a subsequent mortgage or deed
priority over a prior mortgage, in spite of actual notice. In each,
however, the credit was extended in good faith, and apparently
prior to the defective mortgage's execution. Such cases, as already-
suggested, may better be decided upon the rationalization employed
in the Paulsen case.24 The Blumtauer case alone militates directly
against the law as stated in the Paulsen case and certainly the scope
of the earlier decision, if it is to be followed at all, should not be
extended beyond statutory liens. GoRDON H. SwE wy.
2' oy & Co. v. Scott, Hartley & Co., 11 Wash. 399, 39 Pac. 679 (1895)
Hinchman v. Point Defiance Ry. Jo., 14 Wash. 349, 44 Pac. 867 (1896)
Farm.er's State Bank v. McCulley, 133 Wash. 365, 233 Pac. 661 (1925)
Perhaps the annotator in 68 A. L. R. 274 intended to cite the Asbury case
only for this proposition.
. 24 Wash. 596, 64 Pac. 844, 85 Am. St. Rep. 966 (1901).
"Note 7, supra.
"Note 8, supra.
